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during the course of the project.
Following

completion

of

the

project,

Plaintiff

submitted

several claims for compensation for the additional work and demanded arbitration of those claims pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the subcontracts.

Defendant denied payment of

Plaintiff's claims and refused to submit the claims to arbitration.
As a result of Defendant's refusal to arbitrate, Plaintiff brought
suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County

for

breach

of

contract

and

to

compel

arbitration

of

Plaintiff's claims.
During the course of the litigation, Defendant raised counterclaims,

primarily

as

offsets

to

Plaintiff's

claims,

liability for failure of performance against Plaintiff.
brought

a Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

counterclaims and to compel arbitration.
bringing

a cross Motion

for

Partial

to

dismiss

alleging
Plaintiff

Defendantfs

Defendant responded by

Summary

Judgment

seeking

dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Utah contractor
licensing law, alleging inter alia that Plaintiff did not hold a
proper contractor's license and, therefore, Defendant alleged that
Plaintiff was barred from bringing an action to recover compensation earned for work performed as a contractor, including an action
for

specific

performance

of

the

arbitration

provision

of

the

subcontract agreements.
The trial court, following unreported oral arguments on the
issues of both the contractor licensing issue and the arbitration
issue, issued an Order in favor of Defendant which summarily denied
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Plaintiff's Motion and dismissed Plaintiff's action, including the
cause of action to compel arbitration, for failure to obtain a
valid contractor's license.
Plaintiff contends in this appeal that it was error for the
trial court to issue such an Order since the contractors license
is not required to maintain an action to compel arbitration.

In

the alternative, if a contractors license is required to maintain
such an action, sufficient evidence was presented to the trial
court to establish that Plaintiff had substantially complied with
the Utah contractor licensing laws and, additionally, to establish
the requisite factual setting wherein the common-law exceptions to
the general statutory bar to recovery by an unlicensed contractor
would apply.

Plaintiff now requests that this Court reverse the

judgment ordering dismissal of Plaintiff's action, and remand the
case to the trial court for resolution on the merits of the
underlying

claim

for specific performance of the arbitration

agreements and/or for breach of contract.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

A.J. Mackay & Sons was a partnership prior to being

incorporated in 1979.

At the time the business was incorporated

in 1979, the name was changed to A.J. Mackay Company. Record at
50, 97 and 111.
2.

Plaintiff lawfully incorporated and changed its name to

A.J. Mackay Company while continuing to operate with the same
personnel and management, and under the same contractor's license.
Record at 50 and 111.
4

3.

The partnership had been properly licensed prior to

incorporation and the corporation maintained the same contractors
license

since

that

time.

All

financial

responsibility

and

technical qualifications were met on each occasion the contractors
license was routinely renewed.
4.

Record at 111 and 112.

No other entity exists which claims the right to use or

uses the contractors license and Plaintiff has continuously worked
under the contractors license since its incorporation in 1979.
Record at 50 and 111.
5.

Plaintiff inadvertently failed to change the name on its

contractor's license until the routine renewal of the contractors
license in 1985.
6.

Record at 111 and 112.

There has only been one business entity and one contrac-

tors license for Plaintiff company since 1979.

Record at 50, 111

and 112.
7.

At the time the name was changed on the contractors

license in 1985, no special qualifications were required. The same
license bearing the same license number was renewed.

The only

difference was the new name appeared on the license.

Thus, the

change in 1985 was merely a change in name on the same license, and
not the issuance of new license.
8.

Record at 112.

During the time the Plaintiff maintained the contractors

license under the previous name, Plaintiff and Defendant had
numerous

dealings

in

the

normal

course

of

business

wherein

Plaintiff and Defendant contracted for Plaintiff to perform work
on various projects.

Record at 49 and 112.
5

9.

On or about February 1, 1984, Plaintiff, as a subcon-

tractor, entered into several subcontract agreements with Defendant
under which Plaintiff was to perform services and to provide
equipment pursuant to the construction of Utah Department of
Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, located West of Little
Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Record at 36 and 49.
10.

At the time the subcontracts were entered into, Plaintiff

was duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah to perform
services required under the subcontract agreements under the name
of "A.J. Mackay & Sons."
11.
Plaintiff

Record at 50, 61, 111 and 112.

The subcontract agreements entered into by and between
and Defendant contain provisions which require the

arbitration of disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant, including
disputes as to the existence of and compensation for extra work.
Record at 28 and 62.
12.

Plaintiff has made demand on Defendant to arbitrate the

disputes and the damages resulting therefrom, which demand has been
denied by Defendant in breach of the subcontract agreements.
Record at 2.
13.

Because Defendant has refused to honor its subcontracts

and arbitrate Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff commenced this action
on or about December 23, 1988 seeking arbitration of its claims
and for payment for certain work performed by Plaintiff which was
above and beyond the original scope of the subcontracts which are
the subject of this action.

Record at 2.
6

14.

At

all

times

during

the

course

of

construction,

Plaintiff's work under the subcontracts and otherwise was subject
to the inspection and approval of both Defendant, a licenced
contractor and UDOT, neither of which are members of the general
public,

and

both

of

contracting entities.
15.

Plaintiff

which

are

sophisticated,

construction

Record at 49 and 112.

is

a solvent

and

financially

responsible

construction company and was solvent and financially responsible
at all times material to the performance of the subcontracts in
question.

There was at no time during the course of the subject

contracts a risk that Plaintiff, in any way, posed any type of
danger to the general public or to the Defendant or to UDOT.
Record at 49, 50, 111 and 112.
16.

A.J. Mackay & Sons and its successor A.J. Mackay Company

have had a long history of working for Defendant Okland Construction Company.
17.

Record at 112.

Defendant was required by the terms of its contract with

UDOT to not subcontract more than 50% of the project work. Okland
thereafter requested that A.J. Mackay Company cooperate in giving
the appearance to UDOT that A.J. Mackay was not a subcontractor but
rather Okland was leasing equipment from A.J. Mackay Company.

In

addition, A.J. Mackay Company's project superintendent was placed
on Defendant's payroll.

However, all payments to the project

superintendent were deducted from the progress payments due A.J.
Mackay Company.
18.

Record at 49, 50 and 112.

Between Plaintiff and Defendant there was never any

7

question that the subcontracts controlled the relationship between
1 1 le Pi ain tiff and Defendant

Record at 112.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As a matter of law, where the parties to a contract provide
a remedy other

thai

seeking redress in the courts, Utah Code

Annotated, Section 58-50-11 does not apply since that section only
bars the commencement or maintenance of an action for compensation.
Thus, where the parties to the contract have agreed to arbitrate
the disputes between them, nothing should prevent the commenceme:^.
or maintenance of an action to enforce arbitration of the disputes
since such an action is

one for compensation.

Further, even if Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 were to
apply to an action to compel arbitration, under the facts presented
to the trial court on the motions for summary judgment, it is clear
that Plaintiff substantially complied with the Utah contractor
licensing laws in that it maintained a valid contractor's license
at all times material and relevant to this action.

While it is

acknowledged that at the time the subcontracts were made, the name
on the license was thai of the Plaintiff's predecessor partnership,
under the facts of this case the Plaintiff was qualified for and
maintained a valid contractor's license for the work it now seeks
compensa~

ne

business

entity was

changed

from

the

predecessor partnership to the current corpoii ate entity; the name
change

at

the

time

of

incorporation

was

minor

and

kept

the

substance a! Ihr name appearing on the contractor's license; the
corporate

entity

maintained

the
8

contractors

license

in

good

standing

at

all

times

and

fully

met

all

of

the

financial

responsibility and technical qualifications required for license
renewal; at the time the name on the contractors license was
changed on the license, no new license was issued but rather the
name was merely changed; no disciplinary action was ever taken by
the former Division of Contractors for the inadvertent failure to
change the name on the license; etc.).
Thus, since Plaintiff was properly

licensed, Defendant's

assertion that Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 bars recovery
by an unlicensed or improperly licensed contractor does not apply
to Plaintiff.
Alternatively, even if the Court were to determine that
Plaintiff has not substantially complied with the Utah contractors
licensing laws and is improperly licensed, the operation of Utah
Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 does not bar recovery by Plaintiff
of the amounts it claims against Defendant herein.
The bar against recovery of compensation by unlicensed or
improperly licensed contractors was originally created by the Utah
Supreme Court.

The creation of the common-law rule against

recovery was to assist in the purpose of the contractor licensing
laws, i.e., to protect members of the general public against
unqualified and financially irresponsible contractors.

However,

in order to avoid the harshness of the rule against recovery, to
avoid inequitable forfeitures, and to prevent parties from unjustly
avoiding their legitimate contract obligations, the Utah Supreme
Court, through many decisions, also created many equitable excep9

tions to the rule against recovery.
The common-law ni 1o against recovery was codified by the Utah
legislature in 1981.

However, the common-I aw equitable exceptions

to the application of the rule against recovery remained intact.
Thus, Plainttft asserts that even if its contractor's license
was technically deficient under the terms

s.

Section 58-50-11, the equitable exceptions tc

-

rotated

the statutory bar

created by tl li s coi ir t a p p ] } ? \ inder the circumstances of this case.
The

facts which give

exceptions

rise

to the

application

of

tlle equitable

to the rule against recovery are: (1) Plaintiff worked

under the direct supei vision ni

,i lin-:.

1 contractor

(i.e, the

D e f e n d a n t ) ; (2) neither the Utah Department oi Transportation, the
z the

roject, nor the Defendant

general contractor

are

members of the ciass of persons \ vhioh I ho c o n t r a c t o r l i c e n s i n g l a w
is designed to protect; (3) Defendant relied oiI its past dealings
with

1*."*

rather than on the contractor licensing statute to

ensure that Plaintiff was a responsible cont-ractor; (4) Plaintiff
has

all

times

complied

with

the

financial

and

technical

r e s p o n s i b j J H";i|l r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e U t a h c o n t r a c t o r 1 icensing law;
(5) Plaintiff has not acted in a willful, fraudulei it on deceitful
manner and has not flagrantly disregarded the contractor licensing
law;

(6) Plai n ti ff has corrected

deficiencies

in its

contractors

and all possible
license;

(7) it

would

unnecessary and undue forfeiture in this case to bar

technical
an

Plaintiff f s

action to ipeover on its .subcontracts; and (8) the benefit "of such
forfeiture would benefit not the State but only the Defendai it who
10

has wrongfully repudiated its contractual obligations.
Defendant in the present action should not be allowed to use
the statutory bar to avoid the just resolution of Plaintiff's
claims based on a disputed technical deficiency in its compliance
with the contractors licensing law which has not been proved at
trial.

This is especially true where there are judicially created

equitable exceptions to the rule against recovery which strongly
militate against such a result under the circumstances of the
present case.
ARGUMENT
Defendant, in a blatant effort to avoid honoring its contract
obligations, has raised the argument that Plaintiff was not duly
licensed to provide construction services on the subject project
so that its claims to enforce the subcontract provisions are barred
by Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 (1953 as re-enacted in
1985).

This section states:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or
maintain any action in any court of the state
for collection of compensation for the performance of any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.

This statutory provision has had a long and varied history as
discussed above.

However, there has only been one case which has

been decided under the rule against recovery since it was codified
by the Utah legislature in 1981. That case is Wilderness Building
Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d
11

766

(Utah 1985),

and is

discussed in detail in Section XV. below. Although the Wilderness
Court u J Lliiiati- l.y ruled against the claimant, it applied the equitable exceptions to the rule against recover y to tl le facts of that
case.
I.

STANDARD I

CASES DECIDED ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT.
i ;:

" l-e Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

summary judgment should be granted only if there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter ui \.tw i, See Bowen v. Riverton city, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah
1982).
Initially

*

MI - must decide

entit «- , .

i law.

if the Defendant was
This Court must decide

whether as a matter of law a person must comply wit
contractors licensing statute t > enforce arbitration provisions
agreed upon

*. r\* • act.

inxs Court must also

decide as a matter of law whether the equitable exceptions to the
rule against recovery as stated in Utah Code Annotated Section 5850-11 are applicable.

Pho stdudard

ii ie* M 1 ^ which this Court

applies in reviewing the trial court's decisions regarding issues
of 1 iw i one of correctness.

No deference is given to the trial

courtf s determination.
Since the Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.zld 766
(Utali 1985), Court has already made the determination that the
equitable exceptions do apply, the question becomes one of viewing
the facts presented to the trial court in the light most favorable
12

to the Plaintiff.
After resolving these legal issues in favor of the Plaintiff,
this Court must examine there facts in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff.

Ld.

Since there are disputed issues of material

fact regarding the elements of the equitable exceptions to the rule
against recovery, the trial court's decision must be reversed and
the case remanded.

Further, there are uncontroverted facts put

forth by the Plaintiff which clearly fall within the equitable
exceptions to the rule against recovery.
The trial court's decision was based solely upon its view that
the Plaintiff was not properly licensed.

There was no discussion

of the equitable exceptions nor were there any findings which would
indicate the lower court's reasoning.
II.

LICENSURE UNDER THE CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE IS NOT A
PREREQUISITE TO COMMENCING AND MAINTAINING AN ACTION TO
ENFORCE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT ENTERED
INTO BY THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
By

its own terms, Utah Code Annotated

Section

58-50-11

purports to bar only the commencement or maintenance of actions in
the

courts

of

this

state

for

"collection

of

compensation".

However, Plaintiff's action herein was not an action for collection
of compensation.

Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 should be

applied strictly according to its terms since it seeks to abrogate
a fundamental right of having one's disputes resolved through the
courts.
Plaintiff is merely seeking to enforce an alternative dispute
resolution procedure outlined in the contract between Plaintiff and
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Defendant.

Where the parties to a contract have agreed upon a

method of dispute resolution other than a collection action in the
"courts of the state", Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 should
not bar an action to enforce the alternative method of dispute
resolution.
Plaintiff

There is no basis in law or in fact to prevent the
from

subcontracts.

enforcing

the

arbitration

provisions

See generally, Memoranda of Plaintiff

of

the

beginning

Record at 49 and 114.
III. APPELLANT
CONTRACTS,
THE STATE
PROVISIONS

IS, AND AT ALL TIMES MATERIAL TO THE SUBJECT
WAS A DULY LICENSED CONTRACTOR UNDER THE LAWS OF
OF UTAH SO THAT ITS CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE
OF THE UTAH CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE.

Defendant has argued that Plaintiff is barred from maintaining
the present action by asserting that the Plaintiff was not properly
licensed

under

the

Utah

contractor

licensing

statute.

This

argument is without merit since the Plaintiff has at all times
relevant to the subcontracts in question held a valid contractor's
license and has every remedy at law or in equity available to it
to enforce its contractual and other legal rights.
The fact that Plaintiff incorporated its construction company
and changed its name from "A.J. Mackay & Sons" to "A.J. Mackay
Company" does not invalidate its contractor's license.

Nor does

the fact of the reorganization defeat or frustrate the purposes for
which the licensing statute was enacted.
Plaintiff has at all times complied with the financial and
technical

responsibility

licensing law.

requirements

of

the

Utah

contractor

It was the Plaintiff whose financial responsibility
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and technical competence qualified

for the contractors

license

between 1979 (the date of incorporation) and 1985 (the date the
corporate name was substituted on the license).

At the time of the

name substitution in 1985, Plaintiff was not required to re-qualify
with

regard

competence.

to

either

financial

responsibility

or

technical

Plaintiff has not acted in a willful, fraudulent or

deceitful manner and has not flagrantly disregarded the contractor
licensing law.
Utah

has

long

followed

the

general

common-law

rule

of

requiring compliance with the licensing statutes as a prerequisite
to recovery for services requiring a license.

See Olsen v. Reese,

114 Utah 411, 200 P. 2d 733 (1948) and Mosley v.
2d 348, 453 P. 2d 149 (1969).

Johnson.

22 Utah

However, several exceptions to the

general rule were created by the Utah Supreme Court which allowed
a person who was not licensed as required by statute to prevail in
a suit to collect monies due.
the

general

rule

has

mechanically applied.

The Utah Supreme Court referring to

stated,

"Our

common

law

rule

[is]

not

Rather this Court under the old [licensing]

statute considered the merits of each particular case so as to
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures." Loader v. Scott
Construction Corporation.,

681 P. 2d 1227, 1229 (Utah 1984).

the case of Fillmore Products, Inc.

v.

In

Western States Paving,

561 P. 2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977), quoting Corbin on Contracts, Vol.
6A, Sec.

1512, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Although many courts yearn for a mechanically
applicable rule, they have not made one in the
present instance. Justice requires that the
penalty should fit the crime; and justice and
15

sound policy do not always require the
enforcement of the licensing statutes by large
forfeitures going not to the state but
repudiating defendants•
The Court also stated that "This court has not applied the
general rule of denying relief to unlicensed persons mentioned
above inflexibly or too broadly." Fillmore at 689.
Lignell v.

Berg.

593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979).

See also

Further, the Court

in Fillmore said:
The parties should be able to present their
positions to the court because under the facts
of this case—which are undisputed concerning
whether the general rule supra ought to be
applied—the law intended for protecting the
public might become "an unwarranted shield for
the avoidance of a just obligation."
Fillmore at 690 (quoting in part Matchett v. Gould.

131 Cal. App.

2d 821, 281 P. 2d 524 (1955)).
It is due to the harshness of the general rule and the penalty
or forfeiture which the strict application of the general rule can
produce

that

the Utah

Supreme

exceptions to the general rule.

Court has carved

out several

The fundamental principles upon

which the Court has relied in creating the exceptions are that:
(1) The licensing statutes are in place to
protect the general public against technically
incompetent and financially irresponsible
contractors and, therefore, a person not
within the protected class under the statute
will not be allowed to assert the defense; and
(2) Even if the person claiming the defense is
within the protected class under the statute,
if adequate protection of the person in the
protected class is provided by some way other
than the licensing statutes, the general rule
will not be applied.
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In 1981, the Utah legislature codified the common-law general
rule at Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-1-26 and that Section was
re-enacted in 1985 as Section 58-50-11.

That section stated:

No contractor may act as agent or commence or
maintain any action in any court of the state
for collection of compensation for the
performance of any act for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed
contractor when the contract sued upon was
entered into and when the alleged cause of
action arose.
While the common-law rule was the subject of substantial
litigation and court decision, both before and after codification,
the Utah Supreme Court, has had only one occasion to apply the
codified general rule. See Wilderness Building Systems. Inc. v.
Chapman, 699 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985).

Although the Court in the

Wilderness Building Systems case ultimately held that the claimant
was barred from recovery, it analyzed Section 58A-1-26 within the
framework of several of the exceptions to the common-law rule which
had been plead by the unlicensed contractor.

Thus, in light of

Wilderness Building Systems, it is obvious that the common-law
exceptions still apply to the rule that an unlicensed or improperly
licensed contractor is barred from recovery as stated in Utah Code
Annotated Section 58-50-11.
There are at least two exceptions to the general rule which
are applicable to this case and which compel reversal of the lower
court's Order of summary judgment. Further, there were many facts
which were before the lower court which should have prevented it
from ruling that the Plaintiff's action was barred.
17

First, an unlicensed contractor may recover for work performed
if

it

was

under

contractor.
Paving,

the

control

and

See Fillmore Products.

561

P.2d

687

(Utah

inspection
Inc.

1977);

v.

of

a

licensed

Western States

Motivated

Management

International v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979); Kinkella v.
Baugh,

660 P. 2d

233

(Utah

1983);

George v. Oren Limited &

Associates, 672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983); and Wilderness Building
Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).
Plaintiff worked under the direct supervision and inspection
of Defendant, a properly licensed contractor.

This is especially

true since the Defendant was attempting to give the appearance to
UDOT that Plaintiff's personnel were working directly for Defendant
rather than a subcontractor/general contractor relationship as was
the true nature of the relationship.
The second exception to the rule against recovery which is
applicable here is where the contractor has been previously
licensed and the license has lapsed through inadvertence and not
for

cause

or

through

deliberate

rebellion

to

the

licensing

statutes, recovery by an unlicensed contractor is permitted.

See

Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979); and Loader v. Scott
Construction Corporation, 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984).
The Utah Supreme Court has been loath to deny recovery to a
claimant except in circumstances where that claimant has willfully
sought to circumvent the contractor licensing laws. That is simply
not the situation in the case at bar.

Plaintiff maintained a

contractors license and believes that it was properly licensed.
18

At the time the possible deficiency was discovered in 1985, the
name on the license was changed.

It is helpful to note that the

Division of Contractors did not require re-qualification when the
name was changed.
same.

Additionally, the license number remained the

The only thing that changed with regard to the license was

the name.

Even then, the name was substantially the same as the

name shown previously on the license.
The most that can be said with regard to the alleged problems
with Plaintiff's license is that the problems were inadvertent.
Plaintiff

has

technical

responsibility

licensing law.
or

deceitful

at all

times complied
requirements

with
of

the

financial

the Utah

and

contractor

Plaintiff has not acted in a willful, fraudulent
manner

and

has

not

flagrantly

disregarded

the

contractor licensing law. Furthermore, Plaintiff has corrected any
and all possible technical deficiencies in its contractors license.
The Utah Supreme Court has also looked to additional factors
which are relevant here.

First, the licensing laws are intended

to protect the general public from financially irresponsible and
technically incompetent contractors.

Where the person asserting

that the claimant's recovery is barred by the application of the
rule against recovery is not a member of the protected class, the
Utah Supreme Court has refused to apply the rule. Thus, a general
contractor has not been allowed to raise the rule against recovery
in an action by a subcontractor.
In

the

present

case,

neither

the

Utah

Department

of

Transportation, the owner of the project, nor the Defendant general
19

contractor are members of the class of persons which the contractor
licensing law is designed to protect.

Therefore, Plaintiff's

claims should not be barred.
Another example where the Utah Supreme Court has been hesitant
to apply the rule against recovery is where the person raising the
defense has repudiated his contractual

obligations and where

application of the rule would cause unnecessary and undue forfeitures.

In the present case, it would work an unnecessary and undue

forfeiture in this case to bar Plaintiff's action to recover on its
subcontracts. Further, the benefit of such a forfeiture would
benefit not the State but only the Defendant who has wrongfully
repudiated its contractual obligations.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that where the protection
afforded by the licensing statute was provided by some other means,
the rule against recovery did not apply.

Thus, the Court has held

that where there were payment and performance bonds, the protection
is provided by a means other than the licensing statute. Furthermore, the Court has held that where a person relied upon his past
dealings with the claimant rather than relying on the licensing
status of the claimant, the rule against recovery did not apply.
In the present case, there is ample evidence that Defendant
did not rely upon the licensing

status of the Plaintiff in

contracting on the subject project.
The strict application of the rule against recovery would not
be appropriate in this case for an additional reason.

The Utah

State Division of Contractors and its successor the Utah State
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Division of Occupational

and Professional

Licensing

has had a

policy allowing contractors whose licenses have lapsed or whose
business organization has changed to renew their licenses without
any additional requirements.
in the normal course.
contractor's

It is as though the renewal were made

The facts of this case are that Plaintiff's

license inadvertently

lapsed,

if at all, and the

Plaintiff was allowed to renew its license with the name change
without any financial or technical re-qualification.

Therefore,

Plaintiff should be allowed to maintain its action and should be
granted summary judgment to compel arbitration and/or recover for
the additional work performed.
IV.

JUDICIALLY
CREATED
EXCEPTIONS
TO THE STATUTE
BARRING
COLLECTION ACTIONS BY NON-LICENSED OR IMPROPERLY LICENSED
CONTRACTORS ARE STILL VALID WHERE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED
BY LEGISLATIVE ACTION OR REJECTED BY EXPRESS COURT RULING, AND
ARE APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTORY BAR OF
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 58-50-11 DOES NOT FRUSTRATE THE
PURPOSE OR THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE UTAH CONTRACTOR
LICENSING STATUTE.
Defendant's

contention

that

this

action

by

Plaintiff

to

enforce the arbitration provisions of the subject subcontracts is
barred by Plaintiff's failure to be properly licensed as provided
by the Utah Contractor

Licensing

statute, Utah Code Annotated

Section 58-50-11, is without merit.

The Utah Supreme Court has

clearly stated the policy to be followed in this State regarding
the

licensing

of

contractors

and

has

applied

the

equitable

exceptions to the codified rule against recovery.
The case of Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), is the only statement to date by the Utah
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Supreme

Court regarding

the right of an improperly

licensed

contractor to bring an action for compensation in the courts under
the present Utah licensing statute.

The opinion in Wilderness

clearly confirms that equitable exceptions to the statutory rule
are still applicable.

The Defendant and the trial court have

ignored this fact. Had the trial court not ignored the Wilderness
case,

it

should

have

reviewed

the

equitable

exceptions

and

concluded that there were sufficient factual issues to prevent the
granting of summary judgment against the Plaintiff.
In Wilderness Building Systems the Supreme Court held that,
under the specific facts of that case, the equitable
law" exceptions traditionally

or "common-

afforded an improperly

licenced

contractor seeking compensation, did not apply to that particular
fact situation.

However, nowhere in the opinion does the Court

state that those exceptions will not apply under any circumstances,
or regardless of the inequity done to the Plaintiff.
In Wilderness, plaintiffs appealed from an adverse judgment
notwithstanding the verdict which was entered on the grounds that
neither plaintiff was a licensed contractor, so that their claims
were barred by operation of the Utah contractor licensing statute.
The plaintiffs in Wilderness argued that three exceptions to the
statutory bar to recovery were applicable to the facts in that
case. First, that an unlicensed contractor may recover from one
who is otherwise protected from the harm the licensing requirements
were designed to prevent. The Court found that under the facts of
the case, there was insufficient evidence to support the contention
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that the defendants were protected by their own knowledge and
expertise.

Thus the court, after considering the application of

that exception to the statutory rule, held in favor of defendants.
Second, the plaintiffs in Wilderness argued that an unlicensed
contractor may recover on a theory of unjust enrichment from one
who knew or should have known at the time of contracting that the
contractor was unlicensed, an argument which also failed under the
particular facts of the Wilderness case.
Finally, the plaintiffs urged that an unlicensed contractor
may recover for work performed under the supervision of a licensed
contractor.

The Supreme

Court

rejected

this

argument

in the

Wilderness case because there was no evidence in the trial record
to support the claim that plaintiff was supervised by a licenced
contractor.

3x1. at 769.

Thus, under the particular facts of Wilderness, the plaintiffs
were

not

allowed

to

maintain

their

action

for

compensation.

However, the particular facts of the case at bar indicate that the
Plaintiff falls within several of the equitable exceptions to the
rule against recovery.
Contrary

to

Defendant's

assertion

in

the

case

at

bar,

Wilderness indicates that the equitable exceptions to the statutory
bar are still in effect.

But unlike the facts in Wilderness, the

case at bar is a proper factual case to enforce those exceptions.
In Wilderness, plaintiffs cited many of the same cases on which
Plaintiff now relies in support of its position.

Nowhere in the

Wilderness opinion does the court specifically overrule any of
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those cases, nor does it state that the principles of those cases
are no longer enforceable under the codified common-law rule. The
fact that the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the exceptions and their
applicability to the facts of the case is strong evidence that the
exceptions still exist and are applicable in a case such as the one
at bar.
In Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc.,
561 P. 2d 687 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, quoting Corbin
on Contracts, stated that:
Where it is clear that the statute requires
the license . . . the courts usually . . .
hold that bargains made in breach of the law
are not enforceable by the wrongdoer. This
accords with sound policy except when it
operates with disproportionate severity. . .
. In general, the nonenforceability of (such)
bargains will have a salutary effect in
causing obedience to the licensing statute.
Therefore, the general rule will no doubt
continue to be maintained as the "general"
rule, while still permitting the court to
consider the merits of the particular case and
to
avoid
unreasonable
penalties
and
forfeitures.
Although many courts yearn for a
mechanically applicable rule, they have not
made one in the present instance.
Justice
requires that the penalty should fit the
crime; and justice and sound policy do not
always require the enforcement of licensing
statutes by large forfeitures going not to the
state but repudiating defendants.
Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
To bar Plaintiff's claim under the facts of the present case
would be to work both an unreasonable penalty and a forfeiture,
and would fly in the face of justice.

This is especially true

where Plaintiff primarily seeks not to recover money due under the
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contract, but merely the benefit of its bargain to resolve disputes
in an alternate forum which is more advantageous and less expensive
for both parties. In the present case, Plaintiff should be allowed
to enforce the arbitration agreement notwithstanding the purported
irregularities in its contractor's license where:
(1)

at all material times Plaintiff had been renewing a
contractor's license but through inadvertence merely
failed to change the name on the license from A. J.
Mackay & Sons to A. J. Mackay Company for a period of
time;

(2)

the Defendant is not among the class whom the statute was
intended to protect, an exception provided under the rule
of Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah);

(3)

the owner of the project was UDOT, another sophisticated
contracting entity, is also not among the class intended
to be protected;

(4)

Plaintiff acted as a subcontractor under the direct
supervision of a licensed contractor with whom it has a
well established history of contracting, and for whom
Plaintiff's

supervisor,

Defendant's

payroll,

at certain

as

discussed

times worked
in

on

Motivated

Management v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979), and
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983); and
(5)

the equitable exceptions to the statutory rule, created
by the cases previously cited by Plaintiff, including
Loader v. Scott Construction Corp., 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah
25

1984) and Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States
Paving,

Inc., 561

controlling.

P.2d

687

(Utah

1977) are

still

Until the Supreme Court reverses its

decision in these cases, the equitable exceptions to the
statutory bar here in question still apply under the
proper circumstances, such as the present case.
Even though the Defendant was aware of this Court's ruling in
the Wilderness case, in the court below the Defendant argued in its
memoranda in support of its motion for summary judgment below, that
the Utah statute should be strictly enforced based on California
policy considerations and a holding by the California Court of
Appeals in the case of General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of
San Bernadino Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. App. 1972). While that
case is, as Defendant suggests, an interesting comparison to the
present case, it is without persuasive or precedential value where
the Utah Supreme Court has already decided both the Utah law and
Utah public policy issues relevant to the application of the
equitable exceptions to the codified common-law rule.
The Utah cases on which Plaintiff relies are replete with
explanations of the legislative intent and purpose of the Utah
legislature when it codified the common-law rule into the present
licensing statute.

Regardless of what the California policy is,

the policy in Utah is that although the statute acts as a general
bar to recovery, it will not be enforced mechanically or strictly
where the dangers against which the legislature sought to protect
do not arise, and where strict enforcement of the statute would
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cause unnecessary and unreasonable forfeitures and would not be in
the best interest of justice.
Defendant argues, based on General Ins., Id., that "If the
legislature intended to create any exceptions, it could have easily
added them to the statute.

Such exceptions to the statute are

matters for the legislature to determine and not for the courts."
However, the Utah Supreme Court, in an effort to avoid unreasonable
penalties and forfeitures not intended by the legislature, has
carved out the exceptions pursuant to their equitable powers and
in furtherance of the legislative purpose of protecting the general
public from financially irresponsible and technically incompetent
contractors.

These exceptions have survived for more than ten

years during which time the legislature has had more than one
opportunity to either narrow their application or remove them
altogether.

It is more easily inferred from the legislative

history on this issue, that the legislature supports application
of the exceptions where the purpose of the statute is essentially
met as it is in the present case.
V.

STRICT APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section 58-50-11 IN
THE PRESENT CASE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE EQUITABLE
EXCEPTIONS WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS AND
WOULD BE INVALID UNDER OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
At the very least, application of Utah Code Annotated Section

58-50-11 without consideration of the equitable exceptions would
be a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights under both the
United States and Utah Constitutions and would be invalid under
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open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
A fundamental principle underlying the United States and the
Utah Constitutions is that of due process of law.

In the case at

bar, if the Court were to apply Utah Code Annotated Section 58-5011, Plaintiff's due process rights would be violated.

See XIV

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
7 of the Utah Constitution.
recovery

are

proper

equitable exceptions.

only

The statute and the rule against

because

of

the

application

of

the

This is true since in order to pass due

process scrutiny, the statute must be tailored to accomplish a
valid state interest. However, where a statute bears no reasonable
relationship to any legitimate state interest, the statute must be
ruled invalid.

The only legitimate state interest which could be

supported by Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 is to protect the
general

public

from

financially

incompetent contractors.

irresponsible

and

technically

In fact, that is the long-stated purpose

of both the common-law and codified rule against recovery by an
unlicensed or improperly licensed contractor. A blind, mechanical,
application of Section 58-50-11 cannot be said to accomplish a
legitimate state interest.

Indeed, there would be no protections

at all to ensure that the statute did in fact accomplish the stated
purpose.
The threshold question for any due process inquiry is that
there must be some state action which interferes with a protected
right.
met

Clearly the threshold requirement for state action has been

in this case.

First, the
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state

legislature

has

enacted

legislation which regulates Plaintiff's chosen profession and
significantly impacts Plaintiff's right to contract.

Second, the

lower court has applied Section 58-50-11 blindly to the detriment
of the Plaintiff.

Thus, state action is clearly present in this

case.
The threshold requirement that the state action affect a
protected right is also clearly met in the present case.

It has

been said that the right to contract is both a liberty and a
property right and is within the protection of guarantee against
the taking of liberty or property without due process of law. See
Application of Forde L. Johnson Oil Co., 84 Idaho 288, 372 P.2d 135
(1962).
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated ". . . inasmuch as
the licensing of [a] business does represent a substantial property
interest . . ., which also has its effect upon the public welfare,
it should not be destroyed or disrupted arbitrarily, nor without
following fundamental standards of due process of law . . . ."
Anderson v. Utah County Board of Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216
(Utah 1979).

Thus a protected right of the Plaintiff has been

affected by the state action.
Once the threshold test has been satisfied, as in the present
case, in order for a statute to pass due process muster, the
inquiry becomes whether

the state

action bears

a reasonable

relationship to some legitimate state interest. While states have
fairly broad powers to regulate individuals and businesses under
the guise of protecting the "public health safety and welfare," the
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power to regulate is not without limits.

In order for a statute

bo be upheld, it must be based upon a legitimate state interest and
Lt must bear some reasonable relationship to that interest.
ether words, the

statute must

accomplish

In

a legitimate state

Interest without overreaching.
While the contractors licensing statute and specifically Utah
Zlode Annotated Section 58-50-11 when coupled with the equitable
exceptions, might not violate Plaintiff's due process rights, the
application urged by the Defendant and believed by the lower court
floes violate Plaintiff's due process rights.
For some time, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the Utah
contractor licensing is intended to protect the general public from
inept and financially irresponsible contractors.

This might be a

legitimate state interest under the state's police powers to
protect the public health, safety and welfare. However, the blind
application

of

Utah

Code

Annotated

Section

58-50-11

of

the

contractors licensing statute bears no reasonable relationship to
that interest.

Furthermore, such an application is overly broad

to accomplish the stated purpose.

There are many persons against

tfhom the rule would be applied that would do nothing to further the
state interest.
It

is

undisputed

herein

that

Plaintiff

(or

at

least

Plaintiff's predecessor) holds, and did hold at all relevant times,
a valid
qualified

contractors
as

license.

to both

Under this

financial

license, Plaintiff

responsibility

and

technical

competence. Plaintiff's personnel were the same ones as those who
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were qualified under the predecessor partnership.

The Plaintiff

was qualified to perform the work for which recovery is sought
through arbitration.

Thus, the legitimate state interest in

protecting the public health, safety and welfare has already been
accomplished

under the

facts of this case.

Therefore, the

application of the contractors licensing statutes and specifically
Utah Code Annotated

Section

58-50-11

to prevent

recovery by

Plaintiff in the present case is unconstitutionally arbitrary and
over-broad.
There are also very substantial constitutional

questions

regarding the Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11, which purports
to take away Plaintiff's right to access to the courts.

The Utah

Constitution states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for
injury done to him in his person, property, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.
Article I, Section 11.

Furthermore, in the case of Christiansen

v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
Many attempts have been made to further define "due
process" but they all resolve into the thought that
a party shall have his day in court -- that is each
party shall have the right to a hearing before a
competent court, with the privilege of being heard
and introducing evidence to establish his or her
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record
thus made.
Id. at 109 Utah 6, 7, 163 P.2d 316.
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Thus, any attempt to prohibit Plaintiff from exercising its
fundamental right to access to the courts of this State must fail
as a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights and right to open
courts.
In determining whether there has been a violation of a
person's rights to due process, the courts have distilled the issue
down to one of fundamental fairness.

In the case at bar, it would

be fundamentally unfair to allow the Defendant to avoid its
contract obligations to Plaintiff on the basis that there were at
most technical problems with Plaintiff's contractors license.

It

would also be constitutionally prohibited and fundamentally unfair
to wholly deprive Plaintiff access to the courts.
CONCLUSION
Under present Utah law, it was error for the lower court to
enter an order granting summary judgment against Plaintiff whereby
Plaintiff's right to recover damages and to specific performance
of the arbitration provision of its contract has been wrongfully
denied. Plaintiff now respectfully requests that this court, based
on the authorities and arguments cited herein, reverse the lower
court's judgment and remand the case for trial on the merits of the
enforceability of the arbitration provision.

It is clear from the

language of the all of the relevant Utah Supreme Court cases that
exceptions to the statutory bar contained in the Utah Contractor
licensing statute apply in the present case. Defendant should not
be

able

to

avoid

responsibility

for

resolving

Plaintiff's

legitimate claims on a purported technical defect in Plaintiff's
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contractor's license.

Furthermore, to apply Utah Code Annotated

Section 58-50-11 mechanically and without resort to the equitable
exceptions would be a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights
as guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitutions and would
be a violation of Plaintiff's right to open courts as guaranteed
by the Utah Constitution.
DATED this 5th day of February.
WALSTA&-& BABCOCK, P.C.

Darrel J(^Bostwick
Attorneys for Plaintiff

3-13-mckay2.brf
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ADDENDUM

Kooei"c f. uaococK (.#0158)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0UR

A.J. MACKAY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

vs.
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.,
Civil No
Defendant.
Plaintiff, for cause of action against Defendant, alleges as
follows:
1.
the

Plaintiff is a corporation authorized and existing under

laws of

the

State

of Utah

having

its

principal

place of

business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.
the

Defendant is a corporation authorized and existing under

laws of the State of Utah

and being

located

in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah.
3.

Plaintiff

construction

and Defendant entered

services

Transportation

Project

as

part

No.

of

the

into an agreement for
Utah

1-215-9(72)10,

Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East.

Department
West

of

of

Little

4.

Pursuant to said agreement, Defendant agreed to pay the

sum of approximately $730,000. plus or minus the reasonable value
of any work added to or deleted from the project.
5.

Plaintiff

has duly performed

all of the terms and

conditions required of it under said agreement.
6.

Defendant has failed to perform pursuant to the said

agreement and has breached the same by:
(a)

failing to pay a sum exceeding $240,000. which is due

and owing Plaintiff by Defendant

after all changes and

credits have been added and deducted together with interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum;
(b)

causing Plaintiff damages for loss of efficiency in an

amount

exceeding

$240,000. by using

improper

contract

management procedures;
(c)

causing

determined

damage

to

Plaintiff

in

an

amount

to

be

at the hearing of this matter by failing to

properly perform its duties and responsibilities as the prime
contractor on the project;
(d)

causing

determined

damage

to

Plaintiff

in

an

amount

to

be

at the hearing of this matter by wrongfully

requiring extra work and duties of the Plaintiff;
(e)

causing Plaintiff a loss of overhead and profit in an

amount to be determined at the hearing of this matte as a
result of the aforesaid breaches of the agreement.
7.

Section 7 of the agreements entitled Disputes, provides

that any dispute concerning matters in connection with these
-2-

agreements, and without the scope of the work, then such dispute
shall be settled by a ruling board of arbitration.
8.

Demand

for arbitration was made upon Defendant on or

about December 27, 1987, in writing.

Defendant has failed and

refused to enter into arbitration as required by the terms and
conditions of the agreement.
9.
render

By reason of the failure and refusal of Defendant to
payment

of

the

sums

due

Plaintiff,

and

to

enter

into

arbitration under the terms and conditions of the Contract, it has
been necessary for the Plaintiff to secure services of an attorney
to represent it in this action.

Defendant should be required to

pay Plaintifffs attorney's fees and costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as
follows:
1.
the

For an order that the Defendant be required to submit

matter

to

arbitration

in

accordance

with

the

terms

and

conditions of the contract and the Utah Arbitration Act.
2.

For Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in this matter.

3.

For

Plaintiff's

costs

of

Court

and

such

other

and

further relief as the Court deems proper in the premises.
DATED this 2-f

day of December, 1988.
WALSTAD & BABC0CK

Robert F. Babcock
Plaintiff's Address:
350 West Hartwell Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
10-3-ajmacoak.cpl
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WXLFORD A. BEESLEY
STANFORD P. FITTS
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
300 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
RICHARD T. LINDBERG

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., :
Defendant.

Civil No. C88-8250
vTudge James S. Sawaya

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
: SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant,

Richard

T.

Lindberg,

having

been

duly

sworn,

deposes and says:
1.

On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff A. J. Mackay

Company

("Mackay"), as subcontractor, entered into subcontract

agreements with Okland, as general contractor, relating to Utah
Department of Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, West
of Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 13 00 East.

The work on

this project was completed in November of 1984.
2.

On or

about

December

28, 1988, Mackay

served

upon

Okland its Complaint seeking arbitration of claims for payment
for certain work allegedly performed by Plaintiff under the above
1

agreements•
3.

All damages claimed by Mackay, if any, against Okland

result from acts of the Utah State Department of Transportation
("UDOT"), and not of Okland, and all such claims pass through to
UDOT and would be the subject of third-party claims by Okland
against UDOT.
4.

The agreement between UDOT and Okland for construction

of the above referenced project does not provide for resolution
of disputes by arbitration.
5.

The granting of arbitration for resolving the issues and

claims of plaintiff Mackay would result in duplicate proceedings
and multiplicity of lawsuits between Mackay, Okland and UDOT.
6.

UDOT

has

indicated

to

Okland

that

it

will

not

participate in any arbitration of Mackay's claims.
7.

Mackay

has

submitted

its

claims

on

the

subject

construction project directly to UDOT through Okland and, over a
period of four years, has participated in negotiations with UDOT
concerning such claims.
8.

The negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland are

without resolution pending documentation from Mackay to resolve
UDOT

concerns

regarding

Mackay's

claims,

including

primarily

concerns that Mackay's claims are the result of not adequately
managing its work forces.
9.

Mackay has not provided any response or documentation

regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland concerning Mackay's
2

claims despite repeated requests over a period of more than four
years.
10.

UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated

damages on the subject project due to failure of Mackay to timely
complete

its work.

Okland has not withheld

any amounts

from

Mackay under its agreements on the project.
11.

Okland

cooperation
including

has sought,

of Mackay
information

over

in pursuing
relating

the past
their

to UDOT

four years, the

claims

against

UDOT,

concerns

that

Mackay

failed to adequately man its work forces, but Mackay has not
provided such cooperation or information.
12.

Mackay has not provided any written notice of alleged

deficiencies in Okland f s work impacting the work of Mackay and
has given no written notice of additional or extra work within
one week of completion of the work.

No written addendum to the

agreejaaats exist relative to the claims of Mackay.
Commission
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ibed and sworn to before me this

day of January,

1989.
04^-*- u^ c'^-'^z—
Notary Public
Residing at.-SLd, ^Tfhi

My Commission Expires:
^-1C--C)Z
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this j j ^ day of
January, 1989:
Robert F. Babcock, Esq.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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i i State of Utah
Norman H. Bangerter

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing

Governor

William E. Dunn
Executive Director

David E. Robinson
Ofviak>n Director

Heber M Wells Building
160 East 300 South/P 0 Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802
801-530-6628

CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained
by the Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
reveals whether an official contractors license has ever been issued to:
A. J. Mackay Company, a corporation, and whether such license, if any, is
current or has expired.

It is hereby certified that license no. 39131-5 was issued by this office
for said licensee on May 31, 1985 with the classifications 1100 General
Engineering and 3030 Demolition & Wrecking.

Said license is current.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by
virtue of Title 58 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere
they would be in my control and possession.

This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in
compliance with RULE 44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 29th. day of
December, 1988.

orge P . ~WeiIer,"Ticense CoordlTlErdJr
State D i v i s i o n of Occupational
/ U tah
t
and Professional Licensing
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Robert F. Babcock (#0158)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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TH'°'

SALTYAM COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

K^B^BKR^^^^^L

A.J. MACKAY COMPANY,
::

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY

vs.

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.,

::

Civil No. C88-8250

:

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
John Henry McCaughey, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
says:
1.

The affiant is over 21 years of age and an officer in A.

J. Mackay Company and as such is knowledgeable about the subject
matter of the instant action.
2.

On or about February 1, 1984, A. J. Mackay Company

("Mackay") entered into subcontracts with Okland Construction
Company ("Okland") for work on a project for the Utah Department
of Transportation

("UDOT") known as West of Little Cottonwood

Creek to West of 1300 East ("Project").
3.

Because Okland had subcontracted out more than was

allowable by UDOT, Okland

asked Mackay

to perform

the work

pursuant to the subcontracts, and not be listed as a subcontractor

to UDOT, but rather be on the payroll of Okland with the payments
being adjusted per the unit prices of the subcontracts so as to
allow Okland to come into compliance with the UDOT requirements.
4.

Mackay began doing business in 1979, as a partnership

jnder the name of A.J. Mackay & Sons.
ander the name of A.J. Mackay

It was later incorporated

Company.

Mackay obtained a

contractor's license in the name of A.J. Mackay & Sons in 1979,
and continued to renew the license in that name until May 1985
fhen the name on the contractor's license was changed to reflect
:he change in the corporate name.

The delay in changing the name

:>n the license was due simply to the fact that it had been
Inadvertently overlooked.
5.

Mackay has been having sporadic discussions with Okland

md UDOT regarding the claims which are the subject matter of this
Lawsuit since during the performance of the work in 1984, and
continuing to the present, the most recent being a meeting with
ill parties and counsel present in October, 1988, which again
jroved unfruitful in reaching

any resolution.

Some of those

liscussions have involved only Mackay and Okland while others, at
)klandfs request, have included UDOT.
6.

Mackay has submitted documentation on its claims to

)kland but Okland has never been satisfied with the documentation
>rovided.
7.

Mackay's claims involve principally the failure of Okland

:o dewater the site and to properly manage and coordinate the work
>n the subject project.
-2-

8.

Okland would like to have UDOT contribute because Okland

believes there was more water on the site than parties had
reasonably anticipated.
9.

That he makes these statements of his own knowledge.

DATED this 'iftv day of February, 1989.
Johpi Henry McC^aughey
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7li? day of February,
1989.
*s\i\C*^

O \Ap^^S^

UOTKB/r PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

Residing At:

rfb-ajmack.aff
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
254 West 400 South, #200
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Telephone: (801) 531-7000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION; IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNTERCLAIMS;
AND
IN
:
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
:
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Plaintiff,

OPPOSITION
FOR vs.
:
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.,
Defendant.

:
:

Civil No.

C88-8250

Judge James S. Sawaya

:

Plaintiff A,J. Mackay Company ("Mackay"), by and through its
counsel of record herein, hereby submits this Memorandum

In

Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to Compel
Arbitration served concurrently herewith in the above entitled
matter.

Plaintiff states as follows:

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

On

or

about

February

1,

1984,

Plaintiff,

as

subcontractor, entered into subcontract agreements with Defendant

Okland Construction Company, Inc., as Contractor under which
Plaintiff was to perform

services and to provide

equipment

pursuant to the construction of Utah Department of Transportation
project number 1-215-9(72)10

("the

project"), located West of

Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East.
2.

At the time the contracts were entered into, Plaintiff

was duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah to perform
services as a construction contractor, under the name of "A.J.
Mackay

& Sons."

Prior to commencing

work on the project,

Plaintiff lawfully incorporated its business and changed its name
to A.J. Mackay Company while continuing to operate with the same
personnel and management, and under the same contractor's license.
3.

Plaintiff has submitted documentation in support of its

claims for compensation to Defendant.

During the course of

construction and thereafter Plaintiff, Defendant and UDOT have had
numerous meetings and exchanged documents regarding Plaintiff's
claims for extra compensation such that any claim by Defendant
that

it

did

not

receive

adequate

notice

of

the

problems

encountered by Plaintiff is frivolous and without merit.

While

the dialogue between the parties has been sporadic since the
completion of the project, all parties know that the dispute has
never been resolved.
4.

Completion

continuity

thereof

of

the

disrupted

project

was

delayed,

and

the

as a result of the failure of

Defendant to perform all of its obligations including adequately
dewatering the site to allow Plaintiff to perform its work as
2

contemplated by the subcontracts.

Plaintiff has made demand on

Defendant to arbitrate the disputes and the damages resulting
therefrom, which demand has been denied by Defendant in breach of
the subcontracts.
5.

Because Defendant has refused to honor its contract and

arbitrate Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff instigated this action on
or about December 28, 1988 seeking arbitration of claims for
payment for certain work performed by Plaintiff which was above
and beyond the scope of the subcontracts which are the subject of
this action.
6.

The subcontracts contain an arbitration provision which

Plaintiff seeks to enforce by summary judgment issued by this
court.

The arbitration provision contained in the subcontracts is

applicable to Plaintiff's claims for extra compensation in this
case.
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.

ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AN ARBITRATION
PROVISION SHOULD BE DECIDED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT

It is widely held that where one party to a contract seeks to
enforce an arbitration agreement contained therein, and the other
party contends that the agreement does not apply to the disputed
claims, the court should decide the issues of enforceability of
the provision by summary adjudication.
for the moving

party,

the court

And, if the court finds

should

order

arbitration.

American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority,
562 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1977).
moved

for

partial

In the present case, both parties have

summary

judgment
3

on

the

issue

of

the

enforceability

of the arbitration provision of the

subcontracts•

subject

By weight of authority, public policy and the

undisputed facts of this case the enforceability of the subject
provisions is the proper subject of summary judgment which should
issue in favor of Plaintiff,
II.

PLAINTIFF WAS AT ALL TIMES DULY LICENSED UNDER THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO PERFORM CONSTRUCTION SERVICES
PURSUANT TO THE SUBJECT SUBCONTRACTS.

Defendant, in an effort to avoid honoring its contract
obligations, has raised the argument that Plaintiff was not duly
licensed to provide construction services on the subject project
so that its claims to enforce the subcontract provisions are
barred by the applicable Utah Contractor Licensing statute.

This

argument is without merit in that Plaintiff has at all times
relevant to this contract held a valid contractors license and
has every remedy at law or in equity available to it to enforce
its contractual

and other rights.

The

fact that Plaintiff

incorporated its construction company and changed its name from
"A.J. Mackay & Sons" to "A.J. Mackay Company" does not invalidate
its contractor's license.

Nor does the fact of the reorganization

defeat or frustrate the purposes for which the licensing statute
was enacted.
Utah has

long

followed

the general

common-law

rule of

requiring compliance with the licensing statutes as a prerequisite
to recovery for services requiring a license.

See Olsen v. Reese,

114 Utah 411, 200 P. 2d 733 (1948) and Mosley v.
Utah 2d 348, 453 P. 2d 149 (1969).
4

Johnson.

22

However, several exceptions to

the general rule were created by the Utah Supreme Court which
allowed a person who was not licensed as required by statute to
prevail in a suit to collect monies due.

The Utah Supreme Court

referring to the afore-mentioned rule has stated, "Our common law
rule [is] not mechanically applied.

Rather this Court under the

old statute considered the merits of each particular case so as to
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures." Loader v.
Construction Corporation.

Scott

681 P. 2d 1227, 1229 (Utah 1984).

the case of Fillmore Products, Inc.

v.

In

Western States Paving,

561 P. 2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977), quoting Corbin on Contracts, Vol.
6A, Sec.

1512, the Utah Supreme Court stated:

Although many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable
rule, they have not made one in the present instance.
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; and
justice and sound policy do not always require the
enforcement of the licensing statutes by large forfeitures
going not to the state but repudiating defendants.
The Court also stated that "This court has not applied the
general rule of denying relief to unlicensed persons mentioned
above inflexibly or too broadly." ^Id.
593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979).

See also Lignell v.

Berg.

Further, the Court said:

The parties should be able to present their positions to the
court because under the facts of this case-which are
undisputed concerning whether the general rule supra ought to
be applied -- the law intended for protecting the public
might become "an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a
just obligation."
Fillmore at 690 (quoting in part Matchett v.
App.

Gould.

13! Cal.

2d 821, 281 P. 2d 524 (1955)).
It is due to the harshness of the general rule and the

penalty or forfeiture which the strict application of the general
5

rule will produce that the Utah Supreme Court has carved out
several exceptions to the general rule.

The fundamental princi-

ples upon which the Court has relied in creating the exceptions
are:
(1) The licensing statutes are in place to protect the
general public against technically incompetent and financially irresponsible contractors and, therefore, a person not
within the protected class under the statute will not be
allowed to assert the defense; and
(2) Even if the person claiming the defense is within the
protected class under the statute, if adequate protection of
the person in the protected class is provided by some way
other than the licensing statutes, the general rule will not
be applied.
In 1981, the Utah legislature codified the common law general
rule at Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-1-26.

That section

states:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any
action in any court of the state for collection of
compensation for the performance of any act for which a
license is required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when the
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged
cause of action arose.
In 1985, the Utah legislature recodified the section at Section
58A-la-13 and in 1987 the Utah legislature again recodified the
section at Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11.
The Utah Supreme Court, has had only one occasion to apply
the new statute.

See Wilderness Building Systems.

Chapman, 699 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985).

Inc.

v.

Although the Court ultimately

held that the claimant was barred from recovery, it analyzed the
new statute within the framework of several of the common law
general rule exceptions which had been pled by the unlicensed
6

contractor.

Thus, in light of Wilderness Building Systems, it is

obvious that the common law exceptions still apply to the rule
that an unlicensed contractor is barred from recovery as stated in
Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-la-13.
There are at least two of the exceptions to the general rule
which are applicable to this case and which compel a denial of the
Defendant's motion.

First, an unlicensed contractor may recover

for work performed if it was under the control of a licensed
contractor.
Paving,

See Fillmore Products.

561

P.

International v.

2d

687

(Utah

Finney.

Inc.

1977);

v.

Motivated

Systems,

Management

604 P. 2d 467 (Utah 1979); Kinkella v.

Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983); George v.
Associates.

Western States

Oren Limited &

672 P. 2d 732 (Utah 1983); and Wilderness Building

Inc.

v.

Chapman, 699 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985).

Second,

where the contractor has been previously licensed and the license
has lapsed through inadvertence and not for cause or through
deliberate rebellion to the licensing statutes, recovery by an
unlicensed contractor is permitted.
2d 800 (Utah 1979); and Loader v.

See Lignell v.

Berg. 593 P.

Scott Construction Corporation,

681 P. 2d 1227 (Utah 1984).
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff's work was supervised,
inspected

and

approved

by

a properly

licenced

Defendant Okland Construction Company, Inc.

contractor,

Furthermore, the

uncontroverted evidence is that the failure to change, the name on
Plaintiff?s contractor's license was inadvertent.

The strict

application of the rule against recovery would not be appropriate
7

in this case for an additional reason.

The owner of the project

is UDOT, a sophisticated owner that does not need the same level
of protection from "unlicensed" contractors as does the general
public.
The facts of this case are that Plaintiff held a contractors
license, but inadvertently failed to change the name until after
entering

subcontracts with Defendant.

Therefore, under the

policies of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State contractor's
licensing authority Plaintiff should be allowed to maintain its
action,

and

should

be granted

summary

judgment

to

compel

arbitration.

III. THE DISPUTED CLAIMS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE
SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION EVEN THOUGH THEY TANGENTIALLY
INVOLVE THE OWNER.
Defendant argues, in the case at bar, that enforcement of the
arbitration

agreement will materially prejudice its interest

because UDOT has refused

to participate

in the arbitration.

Defendant also argues that arbitration is unenforceable in that
even if Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for failure to dewater
and for failure to pay for work performed beyond the scope of the
subcontracts, Plaintiff's claims should be passed through to UDOT
who, Defendant asserts, is ultimately liable.

On the basis of

these two arguments, Defendant hopes to avoid enforcement of the
arbitration provision.
Defendant's argument is fatally flawed as a matter of law in
two important respects: (1) few, if any, of Plaintiff's claims
8

will pass through to UDOT, and (2)

UDOT's participation or lack

thereof in the arbitration is irrelevant and immaterial to the
resolution of Plaintiff's claims, and Defendant's counterclaims.
At the present stage of this case, UDOT is not a named party
in interest to the litigation.

Therefore, there are no claims by

either party to the litigation which can affect the rights of UDOT
in anyway.

The essence of the litigation is a claim for breach of

the Subcontract, to which UDOT is not a party. Therefore, the
dispute to be resolved by arbitration is between Plaintiff and
Defendant, and in no way involves UDOT as a separate entity or
interested party.
Obviously

UDOT

personnel

will

be

called

upon

to give

testimony relevant to the issues raised at the arbitration.

But

UDOT's participation as a party to the arbitration is not required
to protect the parties to the Subcontract here in question.

If

Defendant intends to recover damages against UDOT for breach of
the prime contract, Defendant should sue UDOT on the merits of its
Dwn claims, and pursue all of its legal remedies at its peril just
as Plaintiff is having to do in the present action.
In support of the contention that UDOT' s participation in the
arbitration is immaterial to the resolution of the dispute between
Plaintiff and Defendant, court's in several jurisdictions have
concluded that where the dispute to be resolved is between the
contractor and its subcontractor, arbitration is appropriate even
Lf it will touch on the interests or involvement of the owner.
7

or example, in In re Arbitration of W.A. Bottinq Plumbing v.
9

Constructors-Pamco, 47 Wash.App. 681, 736 P.2d 1100 (1987) the
Washington

Court

of Appeals

upheld

the

enforcement

of

an

arbitration agreement in a case factually similar to the one at
bar.

In Botting the dispute was as to a unit price adjustment for

material to be supplied by the subcontractor, which dispute was
covered by the arbitration provision of the subcontract.

The

contractor argued that, because the adjustment was to be agreed to
by the Contractor, the Engineer and the Owner, the subcontractor's
failure to obtain mutual agreement before seeking payment of a
higher unit price was in breach of the contract and therefore the
arbitration board erred in awarding extra compensation to the
subcontractor.

Following the arbitration, Pamco submitted a

memorandum to the arbitrator contesting the award on several
grounds, including the arbitrator's lack of jurisdiction.

Pamco

argued that where the dispute involved parties in addition to the
contractor

and

subcontractor,

arbitration agreement.

it was

not

subject

to the

The arbitration was reopened, and after

consideration of arguments from both sides, the award to the
subcontractor was sustained and ratified by the trial court.

On

appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision upholding
the award to the subcontractor.
Court

stated

the

basic

rule

In reaching that result, the
as to

the

enforceability

of

arbitration agreements as follows:
.the contract provides for arbitration of disputes
arising between the contractor, Pamco, and the subcontractor, Botting. In determining whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate a dispute the balance is weighted in
favor of arbitration.
10

In support of this general conclusion, the Court relied on
the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp, v, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct.
3346, 3354

(1985) wherein the Supreme Court held that "the

parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously
construed as to issues of arbitrability."
The Botting Court also found that "Washington courts have
held that a court's inquiry into arbitrability is finished when a
complaint

on its

face

calls

for

an

interpretation

of

the

agreement. . . .The inquiry into whether or not each of the items
in

dispute

indeed

involved

a

party

other

than

the

contractor/subcontractor is a factual determination best left to
the arbitrator."
This

reasoning

is the

premise

underlying

the

court's

conclusion that the contractor's "assertion that the fact that the
dispute

involves

subcontractor
arbitration

more

parties

automatically
clause

than

precludes

is not well

the

contractor

the triggering

taken."

The Botting

and

of the
Court

correctly concurred with the U.S. Court of Appeals and held that
"even if the rights of

[the contractor] cannot be vindicated

without consideration of the owner's . . . actions, this dispute
is between only two parties, the prime contractor and the subcontractor."

In re Arbitration of W.A. Botting Plumbing and

Heating v. Constructors-PAMCO, 47 Wash.App. 736 P.2d 1100, 1102
(1987)(citing United States ex rel. Newton v. Neumann Caribbean
Int'l, Ltd., 750 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).)
11

A.

UDOT's participation in the arbitration is irrelevant where
the disputed claims pertain only to the subcontracts.
Plaintiff, as Defendant has laboriously pointed out, has made

claims for payment for extra work performed in connection with the
completion of the subject project.

As regards those claims for

payment, Defendant has both refused to make payment to Plaintiff
and raised specific counterclaims alleging Plaintiff's breach of
the subcontracts by inter alia delay in completion of the project
and for negligently managing its work forces.

But what Defendant

has failed to realize is that all of its counterclaims allege
causes of action against Plaintiff for breach of the subcontracts
and do not in any way allege or imply that UDOT is in anyway
liable for damages either to Plaintiff or Defendant.

Plaintiff is

suing here to enforce its rights under the subcontract against
Defendant.

Plaintiff

seeks redress of

its claims

against

Defendant under the specific terms of the subcontracts which apply
only to Plaintiff and Defendant and not to UDOT.

Therefore, UDOT

is not an indispensible party to the arbitration as suggested by
Defendant.

Under the reasoning of Batting, which is a logical

extension of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lindon City, 636
P. 2d 1070 (Utah 1981) upholding the freedom to contract and the
general rule favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,
Plaintiff

should be allowed

to arbitrate its claims against

Defendant regardless of UDOT's participation in the arbitration.
If it is determined
Plaintiff's

claims

at the arbitration

are

that any or all of

"pass through" claims to UDOT,' then
12

Defendant will have to seek reimbursement through whatever legal
means

are

project.

available

to

it

against

UDOT

as

the

owner

of

the

Public policy favors arbitration as being in the best

interest of judicial economy and justice.
IV.

THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND PUBLIC POLICY
FAVOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CASES
SUCH AS THE ONE AT BAR.

It is settled in Utah that "Arbitration is a remedy freely
bargained

for by the parties, and

'provides

a means of

giving

effect to the intention of the parties, easing court congestion,
and providing a method more expeditious and less expensive for the
resolution of disputes.'"

Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady

Systems, Inc., 731 P. 2d 475, 479

(Utah 1986),

and perhaps more

importantly that, "There is no public policy or other reason to
prevent parties

from

agreeing

to arbitration."

Engineers Const. Co. , 636 P.2d

1071, 1073

Lindon City v.

(Utah 1981).

In the

case at bar the only real issue as to the enforceability of the
arbitration provision under Utah law is whether Plaintiff's claims
are properly within the reach of the arbitration agreements.

As

to determining the scope of agreements to arbitrate, the United
States

Supreme

Court

has

also

concluded

that

"the parties'

intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed
as to issues of arbitrability." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth,

Inc.,

473

U.S.

614,

105

S.Ct.

(1985)(cited supra.).
A*

Public Policy: Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code
Annotated § 78-31a-l et. seq. (1953).
13

3346,

3354

The Utah State Legislature has defined the public policy
regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements by passage
of the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-31a-l et.
seq. (1953)(as amended),

Subsection 78-31a-3, entitled "Court

order to arbitrate" provides that:
A written agreement to submit any existing or future
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to
set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Subsection 78-31a-4, further provides that:
(1)
The court, upon motion of any party showing the
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the
parties to arbitrate* If an issue is raised concerning the
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine
those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
The

standardized

question, prepared

(form) subcontract

documents

here in

by Defendant and signed by Defendant and

Plaintiff provide respectively in section 7 as follows:
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and
Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract
documents.
If none be provided, or if there arises any
dispute concerning matters in connection with this agreement,
and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall
be settled by a ruling of a board of arbitration . . . .
Defendant contends that this provision does not apply because the
prime

contract

disputes.

documents

provide

for

a manner of

settling

In support of that contention Defendant incorrectly

relies on section 105.17 of the prime contract which merely
requires the prime contractor to provide written notice to UDOT of
its intention

to claim compensation
14

for extra work, and it

prescribes penalty for failing to provide the proper written
notice.

Nowhere

does that provision

set forth

any method

whatsoever for the resolution of disputes between the contractor
and the subcontractor.

Defendant's assertion is without merit in

that the section of the prime contract on which it relies does not
preempt either explicitly or otherwise the arbitration clause
contained in the subcontracts.
Defendant next contends that the arbitration provision of the
subcontract does not apply in that the prime contract provisions
contain by implication a dispute resolution scheme purportedly
provided by the Utah Procurement Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-561 et. seq. (1953)(as amended).

Defendant specifically argues that

because the prime contract is subject to the requirements of the
Procurement Code, any dispute resolution scheme provided therein
preempts

the

subcontract

arbitration

provision.

However,

Defendant's argument is both misguided and entirely inappropriate
in that it relies specifically on Utah Code Annotated § 63-56-45
et. seq. as the preemptory dispute resolution procedure.

UCA

Section 63-56-45 provides as follows:
63-56-45. Protest to chief procurement officer-Time
Authority to resolve protest.
(1) Any actual or prospective bidder, offeror, or contractor
who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award
of a contract may protest to the chief procurement officer or
the head of a purchasing agency . . .(emphasis added).
This statute

applies only to a contractor who has been

purportedly wronged during the state's bidding and award process.
The provisions cited by Defendant have no bearing whatsoever,
15

either by implication or otherwise, on the resolution of disputes
between a subcontractor and the prime contractor on subcontracts
which have been substantially, if not completely performed, and to
which the state is not a party.

Even if the Utah Procurement Act

did apply to the subcontracts, Defendant has failed to cite a
provision thereof which in any way resembles a dispute resolution
procedure applicable by reference to the prime contract between
UDOT and Defendant, which could deny Plaintiff the protection of
the arbitration provision of the subcontracts.

Defendant's

argument as to the applicability of the Utah Procurement Code
falls well short of a legitimate bar to enforcing the arbitration
provision.

It is reasonably clear that the prime contract

documents contain no provision for resolution of disputes on the
contract so that if any arbitrable issues exist, Plaintiff is
entitled to arbitrate its claims.

B.

Arbitrability of Disputed Claims
Defendant has raised no issue of material fact as to the

existence
Plaintiff.

of

an agreement
Therefore,

to arbitrate

under

the

between

provisions

of

itself and
the Utah

Arbitration Act, the court is bound to order the parties to
arbitrate.

The only issue left open for determination by the

court in this motion, is the scope of the matters which are
subject

to the

terms of the

arbitration

agreement.

This

determination is essentially one of construction of a specific
term of the contract and should therefore limit the court deciding
16

the issue of arbtitrability to the traditional rules of contract
construction,
ambiguity

including

but not

against the drafter

limited

to construing

any

(Defendant), interpreting

the

contract so as to best accomplish the intent of the parties upon
making the contract and the rule favoring arbitration.
As regards arbitration agreements specifically, The Utah
Supreme Court in Lindon City, supra., stated that "Doubts as to
whether the content of a contract is arbitrable should be resolved
in favor of the parties1 freedom to contract." Id. at 1073.

In

making this statement, the Utah Court relies on the language of
King County v. Boeing Company, 18 Wash. App. 595, 570 P.2d 713
(1977) wherein the Washington Court of Appeals holds that:
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of
an arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt,
the clause should be construed in favor of arbitration unless
it can be said that it is not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. . . . If an
arbitrable issue exists, the parties should not be deprived
of the benefits of the agreement for which they bargained.
King County v. Boeing Co., 570 P.2d
1977)(cited in Lindon City at 1073).

713, 717-718 (Wash. App.
See also, Docutel Olivetti

Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986). See also,
American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority,
562 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1977)(Party should not be required to litigate
disputes which are subject to arbitration agreement, and there is
national policy to effect that doubts are to be resolved in favor
of arbitrability.);

In re arbitration of W.A. Botting Plumbing

and Heating Co. and Constructors-PAMCO, 47 Wash.App. 681, 736 P.2d
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(1987)(In

determining

whether parties

have

agreed to

arbitrate dispute, balance is weighed in favor of arbitration.)•
Defendant attempts to raise doubts as to the arbitrability of
Plaintiff's claims by arguing that Plaintiff failed to satisfy
conditions

precedent

to the enforcement

of the

arbitration

provision by failing to provide timely written notice of its
claims for extra compensation related to Contractors failure to
properly perform.

Specifically, Defendant relies on sections 2

and 6 of the subcontracts.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has at

no time made satisfactory written notice, so as to protect
Plaintiff's right to arbitrate.

Plaintiff, in turn has stated

that timely and adequate notice was received by Defendant so that
the disputed claims are now ripe for adjudication by arbitration.
See Affidavit of John Henry McCaughey.
The arbitration clause provides that "In the event of any
dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the
scope of the work . . . .
of arbitration . . . "

shall be settled by a ruling of a board

(emphasis added).

This provision makes no

reference to the notice requirements on which Defendant relies to
avoid arbitration.

While it is reasonable to expect that the

contractor may assert a defense as to the timeliness of the notice
of claims for extra compensation during the arbitration process
that is the place to determine the merits to the defense after
hearing all of the evidence as to notice issue.

The notice

requirement should not be litigated now as a precondition to
arbitrating the claims.
18

Closer examination of the subcontract provisions on which
Defendant relies in asserting that Plaintiff's failure to provide
timely written notice of its claims, reveals that nowhere do said
provisions

state

requirements

that

failure

is a waiver

of

to

comply

Plaintiff's

with
rights

the

notice

under

arbitration provision of section 7 of the subcontracts.

the
The

arbitration agreements are not dependant upon notice of any kind
and is the best evidence of the parties intent to arbitrate any
and all disputes arising under the subcontracts for extra work
performed by the subcontractor,

V- CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to raise an issue of fact by way of its
pleadings, and affidavits on file with the court, of sufficient
materiality

so as to defeat the proper construction of the

subcontract

arbitration

agreements.

Plaintiff

is therefore

entitled to a summary judgment to compel arbitration of its claims
according to the terms of the contract as a matter of law.

The

weight of authority in the Utah courts, and public policy as
decided by the Utah State Legislature

strongly supports the

validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreements at issue
in this case.

Plaintiff respectfully moves that this Court grant

Plaintiff summary judgment and issue an order to compel the
arbitration of Plaintiffs claims.

Furthermore, Defendant's motion

is misguided, frivolous, without merit and in bad faith as to the
material issues in this case and should not have been brought.
19

Plaintiff has incurred substantial costs in defending against
Defendant's motion.

Plaintiff therefore prays, in addition to an

order to compel the arbitration of Plaintiff's claims, for
attorney's fees and costs of court along with all other awards
which the court deems just and appropriate.
DATED this

b

day of February, 1989.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.

By

(M/^u

yf (fiiXu>J<-

Robert F. Babcock
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY certify that on this

(,; -

day of February, 1989, I

hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION;

IN

SUPPORT

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION

TO

DISMISS

COUNTERCLAIMS; AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following:

Wilford A. Beesley
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
310 Deseret Book Building
40 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ddAU £ J&xJRP-1/MEMSJX.222
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Robert F. Babcock (#0158)
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.
Attorneys for
254 West 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
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SALT LAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

::

vs.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY

:

OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.,

:
:

Civil No. C88-8250
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
John Henry McCaughey, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and
says that:
1.
Company

That A. J. Mackay & Sons and its successor A. J. Mackay
have

had

a

long

history

of

working

for

Okland

Construction•
2.

That A. J. Mackay & Sons was a partnership prior to being

incorporated in 1979.

At the time it was incorporated the name

was changed to A. J. Mackay Company.
3.

The company inadvertently failed to change the name on

its contractor's license until it was renewed in 1985.
4.

There has only been one company and one contractor's

license for that company since 1979 although there was admittedly

an inadvertent delay in changing the name over on the contractor's
license.
5.

Tne cnange in.the name was simply that a name change*

A

new license was no~c oo'camea in JL^OO OUT: ratner -cne name was
simply changed from A, J. Mackay & Sons to A. J. Mackay Company*
6*

That Okland was required by the terms of its contract

with the Utah Department of Transportation to not subcontract more
than 50% of the contract.
more than 50% of the work.

Okland in reality wanted to subcontract
Okland therefore requested that A. J.

Mackay Company cooperate in giving the appearance to UDOT that A.
J. Mackay was not a subcontractor but rather that Okland was
leasing equipment from A. J. Mackay Company.

In addition, A. J.

Mackay Company's superintendent was on the payroll of Okland.
7.

That between Okland and A. J. Mackay Company there was

never any question that the subcontracts were the controlling
contract documents.

All payments to the superintendent were

deducted from the progress billings to A. J. Mackay Company.
8.

That the significance of the last two facts in this

proceeding

is simply

to show that there existed

a working

relationship between the parties that evidences the fact that
Okland was not concerned about the license status and is not part
of the class of people intended to be protected by the licensing
statute.
DATED this j2^//fday of February, 1989.
JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY

-2-

VN

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Z/

>'j //

djay /ofV February,

1989.
NOTARY' PUBLIC
Residing At:

My Commission Expires

V^V

- • 7

'",.'' J •'--'"

rfb-mackay.aff

-3-

<MHH^3

\J%-

FILED
DISTRICT COURT

R o b e r t F. Babcock ( # 0 1 5 8 )
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P . C .
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
254 West 400 S o u t h , # 2 0 0
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No.
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.,

C88-8250

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record and
hereby submits this reply memorandum of in support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment to Compel arbitration and in opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims and to avoid arbitration.

In addition to

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities already on file
with the Court, Plaintiff further states as follows:

VJT

v-/

W#

sf*m •'—»•

Supplemental Statement of Material Facts
1.

At

all

times

during

the

course

of

construction,

Plaintiff's work under the subcontracts and otherwise was subject
to the inspection and approval of both Defendant, a licensed
contractor, and UDOT neither or which are members of the general
public,

and both of which

are sophisticated,

construction

contracting entities.
2.

Plaintiff was a responsible contractor at all times

material to the performance of the subcontracts in question.
There was at no time during the course of the subject contracts a
risk that Plaintiff, in any way posed any type of danger to the
general public, to the Defendant or to UDOT.
3.

There are no provisions of either the Subcontract or the

Prime Contract which preclude enforcement of the Arbitration
agreement contained in the subcontracts.
4.
Company

That A. J. Mackay & Sons and its successor A. J. Mackay
have

had

a

long

history

of

working

for

Okland

Construction.
5.

That A. J. Mackay & Sons was a partnership prior to being

incorporated in 1979.

At the time it was incorporated the name

was changed to A. J. Mackay Company.
6.

The company inadvertently failed to change the name on

its contractor's license until it was renewed in 1985.
7.

There has only been one company and one contractor's

license for that company since 1979 although there was admittedly

2
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an inadvertent delay in changing the name over on the contractor's
license.
8.

The change in the name was simply that a name change.

A

new license was not obtained in 1985 but rather the name was
simply changed from A. J. Mackay & Sons to A. J. Mackay Company.
9.

That Okland was required by the terms of its contract

with the Utah Department of Transportation to not subcontract more
than 50% of the contract.
more than 50% of the work.

Okland in reality wanted to subcontract
Okland therefore requested that A. J.

Mackay Company cooperate in giving the appearance to UDOT that A.
J. Mackay was not a subcontractor but rather that Okland was
leasing equipment from A. J. Mackay Company.

In addition, A. J.

Mackay Company's superintendent was on the payroll of Okland.
10.

That between Okland and A. J. Mackay Company there was

never any question that the subcontracts were the controlling
contract documents.

All payments to the superintendent were

deducted from the progress billings to A. J. Mackay Company.
11.

That the significance of the last two facts in this

proceeding

is simply

to show that there

existed

a working

relationship between the parties that evidences the fact that
Okland was not concerned about the license status and is not part
of the class of people intended to be protected by the licensing
statute.

Supplemental Statement of Points and Authorities
I.

APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTORY BAR OF
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-50-11 DOES NOT FRUSTRATE THE
3

PURPOSE, NOR THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE UTAH
CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE.
SUCH EXCEPTIONS ARE STILL
VALID WHERE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED BY LEGISLATIVE ACTION
OR REJECTED BY EXPRESS COURT RULING.
Defendant's contention that this action by Plaintiff to
enforce the arbitration agreement in the subject subcontracts is
barred by Plaintiff's failure to be properly licensed as provided
by the Utah Contractor's Licensing statute, Utah Code Annotated §
58A-la-13 (Recodified at 58-50-11 1985), is without merit.

The

Utah Supreme Court has spoken and clarified the policy to be
followed in this state regarding the licensing of contractor's.
Defendant has blatantly failed and avoided to address the opinion
of the Utah Supreme Court in Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v.
Chapman, 699 P.2d

766

(Utah 1985),

which

case is the only

statement by the Utah Supreme Court regarding the right of an
improperly licenced contractor to bring an action for compensation
in the courts, under the present Utah licensing statute.

The

opinion in Wilderness clearly confirms that equitable exceptions
to the statutory rule are still applicable.

In Wilderness the

Supreme Court held that, under the specific facts of that case,
the equitable

or "common law" exceptions traditionally afforded

an improperly licenced contractor seeking compensation, did not
apply.

However, nowhere in the opinion does the Court state that

those exceptions will not apply under any circumstances, or
regardless of the inequity done to the Plaintiff.
In Wilderness/ plaintiffs appealed from an adverse judgment
notwithstanding the verdict which was entered on the grounds that
neither plaintiff was a licensed contractor, so that their claims
4

were barred by operation of the Utah contractor licensing statute.
The plaintiffs in Wilderness argued that three exceptions to the
statutory bar to recovery were applicable to the facts in that
case. First, that an unlicensed contractor may recover from one
who

is

otherwise

protected

from

requirements were designed to prevent.

the

harm

the

licensing

The Court found that under

the facts of the case, there was insufficient evidence to support
the contention that the defendants were protected by their own
knowledge and expertise.

Thus the court, after considering the

application of the exception to the statutory rule, held in favor
of defendants.
Second, plaintiffs

argued that an unlicensed contractor may

recover on a theory of unjust enrichment from one who knew or
should have known at the time of contracting that the contractor
was unlicensed, an argument which also failed under the particular
facts of the Wilderness case.
Finally, the plaintiffs urged that an unlicensed contractor
may recover for work performed under the supervision of a licensed
contractor.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument because

there was no evidence in the trial record to support the claim
that plaintiff was supervised by a licenced contractor, where the
claim was raised for the first time at oral argument on appeal.
Id, at 769.

Under the facts of Wilderness, the plaintiffs were

not allowed to maintain their action for compensation.
Contrary
Wilderness

to Defendant's

indicates

assertion

in the case

that the equitable
5

exceptions

at bar,
to the

statutory bar are still in effect.
factual

case to enforce

those

The case at bar, is a proper
exceptions.

In Wilderness,

plaintiffs cited many of the same cases on which Mackay now relies
in support of its position.

Nowhere in the Wilderness opinion

does the court specifically overrule any of those cases, nor does
it state that the principles of those cases are no longer
enforceable.

The fact that the Supreme Court reviewed the

exceptions and their applicability to the facts of the case is
strong evidence that the exceptions still exist and are applicable
in a case such as the one at bar.
In Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc.,
561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, quoting Corbin
on Contracts, stated that:
Where it is clear that the statute requires the license . .
othe courts usually . . . hold that bargains made in breach
of the law are not enforceable
by the wrongdoer.
This
accords with sound policy except when it operates with
disproportionate severity.
. . .
In general, the
nonenforceability of (such) bargains will have a salutary
effect in causing obedience to the licensing statute.
Therefore, the general rule will no doubt continue to be
maintained as the "general" rule, while still permitting the
court to consider the merits of the particular case and to
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures.
Although many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable
rule, they have not made one in the present instance.
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; and
justice and sound policy do not always require the
enforcement of licensing statutes by large forfeitures going
not to the state but repudiating defendants. Id. at 689
(emphasis added).
To bar Plaintiff's claim under the facts to the present case
would be to work both an unreasonable penalty and a forfeiture,
and would fly in the face of justice.

This is especially true

where Plaintiff seeks not to recover money due under the contract,
6

but merely the benefit of its bargain to resolve disputes in an
alternate forum which is more advantageous and less expensive for
both parties.

In the present case, Plaintiff should be allowed to

enforce the arbitration agreement notwithstanding the purported
irregularities in its contractor's license where: (1) at all
material times Plaintiff had been renewing a contractor's license
but through inadvertence failed to change the name on the license
from A, J, Mackay and Sons to A. J. Mackay Company, (2) the
Defendant is not among the class whom the statute was intended to
protect, an exception provided under the rule of Lingell v. Berg,
593 P. 2d 800 (Utah),

(3) the owner of the project was UDOT,

another sophisticated contracting entity, is also not among the
class intended
subcontractor

to be protected,
under

contractor with whom

the

direct

(4) Plaintiff
supervision

of

acted as a
a

it has a well established

licensed

history of

contracting, and for whom Plaintiff's supervisor, at certain times
worked on Defendant's payroll, the exception provided under the
rule of

Motivated Management v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979),

and Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983), and (5) the
equitable exceptions to the statutory rule, created by the cases
previously

cited

by

Plaintiff,

Construction Corp., 681 P.2d

including

1227

Loader

(Utah 1984) and

v.

Scott

Fillmore

Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah
1977) are still controlling.

Until the Supreme Court reverses its

decision in these cases, the equitable exceptions to the statutory

7

bar here in question still apply under the proper circumstances,
such as the present case.
This application of the Utah cases was recently upheld in a
ruling by Judge Frank G. Noel sitting on this Court.

In the case

of Scott v. Hotel Associates of Utah and Colorado, Ltd., Civil No.
C85-7508, decided on September 16, 1988, the court was presented
with the issue of an improperly licensed contractor's right to
seek recovery

in the courts.

subcontractor's

license

had

In that case the second-tier
lapsed

inadvertently

where the

subcontractor had failed to timely pay its renewal fee.

After

trial to the court, certain rulings were issued from the bench and
certain other issues, the judge took under advisement.

The court

heard oral arguments on the issues taken under advisement on which
it

later

rendered

subcontractor.

judgment

in

favor

of

the

complaining

The Court, in the proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law which are still awaiting final approval, found
that the subcontractor was not barred from recovery where (1) the
lapse was inadvertent, (2) where the subcontractor's work was
supervised and inspected by a duly licensed contractor, and (3)
because the lapse of the license did not affect the degree of
protection afforded the owner of the project, who is member of the
class which the statute is designed to protect.
Defendant Okland further argues that the Utah Statute should
be strictly enforced based on California policy considerations and
a holding by the California Court of Appeals in the case of
General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102
8

coo121

Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. App. 1972).

While that case is, as Defendant

suggests, an interesting comparison to the present case, it is
without persuasive or precedential value where the Utah Supreme
Court has already decided both the Utah law and Utah public policy
issues relevant to the disposition of the present motion.
cases on which Plaintiff relies are replete with

The

explanation of

the legislative intent and purpose of the Utah State Legislature
when it codified the common law rule into the present licensing
statute.

Regardless of what the California policy is, the policy

in Utah is that although the statute acts as a general bar, it
will not be enforced mechanically or strictly where the dangers
against which the legislature sought to protect do not arise, and
where strict enforcement of the statute would not be in the best
interest of justice.
Defendant

argues, based

on General

Ins. that

"If the

legislature intended to create any exceptions, it could have
easily added them to the statute.

Such exceptions to the statute

are matters for the legislature to determine and not for the
courts."

However, the Utah Supreme Court, in an effort to avoid

unreasonable

penalties

and forfeitures not intended

by the

legislature, has carved out the exceptions pursuant to their
equitable powers and in furtherance of the legislative purpose of
protecting
contractors.

the general public from financially

irresponsible

These exceptions have survived for more than ten

years during which time the legislature has had more than one
opportunity to either narrow their application or remove them

9

altogether.

It is more easily inferred

from the legislative

history on this issue, that the legislature supports application
of the exceptions where the purpose of the statute is essentially
met as it is in the present case,

II.

THIS PRESENT ACTION FILED BY PLAINTIFF IS NOT AN ACTION TO
COLLECT COMPENSATION FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY ACT COVERED
BY THE UTAH CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE.
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff has failed to allege

and prove that it was a properly licensed contractor during the
times material to the subcontracts at issue in this action,
Plaintiff

is barred

from

instituting

an action to collect

compensation for acts performed under those contracts for which a
license is required.

In support of its argument, Defendant

correctly quotes the licensing statute which states in pertinent
part:
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any
action in any court of the State for collection or
compensation for the performance of any act for which a
license is required by this chapter without alleging and
proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when the
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged
cause of action arose.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff denies that it was not properly
licensed such that is entitled to maintain and action for damages
or compensation due under the subcontracts or any other valid
legal theory which is supported by the facts of this case.
However, Plaintiff, did not initiate this present action for the
purpose of litigating the merits of its claims for compensation
for extra work performed on the project which was beyond the scope
10

of the subcontracts in this court.

Plaintiff in this action seeks

only specific performance of the arbitration provision of the
subcontracts,

a specific

right granted by agreement of the

parties, the enforcement of which is in the best interest of botl:
Plaintiff and Defendant and in the interest of judicial economy
and justice.
compensation

This
as

is not

"any action"

contemplated

by

the

for collection 01

statutory

language.

Therefore, Plaintiff is well within its rights to seek enforcement
of its agreement to dispute its claims in a forum other than in a
court of the State of Utah.

The statute in this case under nc

circumstances operates as a bar to the present action.

III. WHETHER MACKAY HAS COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE SUBCONTRACT SO AS TO PRECLUDE RECOVERY ON ITS CLAIMS IS %
MATTER OF FACT TO BE DECIDED BY THE ARBITRATION PANEL AND IS
IRRELEVANT TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
UNDER THE SUBCONTRACTS.
In its reply memo, Defendant argues that

"It cannot be

disputed that Mackay did not provide written notice of its claims
as required by the agreements and no written amendment to the
agreements exist with respect to the claims asserted by Mackay."
This is a question of fact as to the merits of Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff, in its motion for summary judgment, is not seeking
adjudication of its claims on the merits by this Court, but rather
the opportunity to present its case to the arbitrators as was
agreed by the parties.

Futhermore, whether the requisite notice

was given is a disputed fact to be decided by adjudication.

The

parties agreed in the subcontracts that any such adjudication
11

would be by an arbitration panel and not by litigation in the
courts.
The parties to the subject subcontracts both contemplated
arbitration as the method for resolving claims of the type now
raised by Mackay.

It is not Mackay who has now changed its mind

in violation of the contracts, but rather it is Defendant which
has gone to great length and expense to deny Plaintiff is rights
under Defendant's own contract terms.

The question of whether the

claims of Mackay could withstand judicial scrutiny (while hotly
contested) is irrelevant and immaterial and wholly inappropriate
to the issue to be decided here, that is, whether the arbitration
agreement is enforceable by Plaintiff.
allegation, Defendant
Plaintiff's

motion

seeks

rests

to cloud

and

to avoid

By making such an
the

issues

on which

enforcement

of the

subcontracts by which Defendant is bound to arbitrate.

IV.

ARBITRATION IS NOT PRECLUDED WHERE PLAINTIFF AGREED TO ALLOW
ITS SUPERVISOR TO WORK ON DEFENDANT'S PAYROLL IN AN EFFORT TO
HELP DEFENDANT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE OWNER.
Defendant, in asserting that the subcontracts containing the

arbitration agreements do not apply because Plaintiff was an
employee of Defendant

and therefore

is not entitled to the

protection of its valid subcontracts, further attempts to confuse
the issues.

Plaintiff has asserted by affidavit that it did a

portion of the project work with some of its personnel on the
payroll of Defendant.

It is an inappropriate misstatement of the

case for Defendant to assert that Plaintiff is somehow precluded
12
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from

enforcing

its

subcontracts

because

it

also,

as

an

accommodation to Defendant, placed some of its personnel on
Defendant's payroll.

The claims which Plaintiff now seeks to

arbitrate arise under the terms of the subcontracts themselves
which claims are subject to the arbitration agreements contained
in said subcontracts•

Defendant simply is seeking to avoid living

up to the terms of the its very own subcontract form.

V.

THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WILL ULTIMATELY PASS
THROUGH TO UDOT IS NOT RELEVANT IN DETERMINING THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.
Defendant argues incessantly that Plaintiff itself has raised

material issues of fact as to whether its claims pass through to
UDOT and whether UDOT is an indispensible party so as to preclude
arbitration.

The flaw in this argument is that the issue of

whether Plaintiff's claims will ultimately pass through to UDOT is
wholly immaterial to the issue to be decided here.

Plaintiff is

not in privity of contract with UDOT, and therefore has no ground
on which to make claims for compensation for work performed beyond
the scope of its subcontract directly to UDOT.
dispute is with Defendant alone.

Plaintiff's

If Defendant expects to seek

reimbursement from UDOT it can do so in its appropriate forum, a
court of competent jurisdiction.
The disposition of the issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled
to arbitrate its disputed claims with Defendant is not dependent
on UDOT in any way.

The arbitration clause should be enforced as

between Plaintiff and Defendant.
13

In entering into the contract,

the parties intended to settle their disputes by arbitration*
There is no provision in the subcontracts, express or implied,
which would preclude arbitration because the interests of the
owner might be involved.
arguments regarding

the

Plaintiff therefore relies on its
issue of

"pass through" claims as

presented in its Memorandum filed previously with this court.
Defendant, in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Partial

Summary

Judgment, relied on several

irrelevant

and

inappropriate cases in support its allegations, including one
which purportedly supports the notion that UDOT is somehow an
indispensible party to the arbitration proceedings. Defendant
relies on the case of Matarasso v. Continental Casualty Co., 82
A.D.2d 861, 440 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1981).

In that case the New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that a nonparty to an
arbitration agreement cannot be held to the arbitration agreement
because he failed

to seek a stay of arbitration within the

statutory time limits.

The main issue in that case was whether

the claimant's uninsured motorist endorsement was applicable to
his umbrella liability policy.

The court found that it was not

applicable such that the arbitration provision of the endorsement
did not apply; therefore, the uninsured motorist insurer was
allowed to stay the arbitration between the insured and the
umbrella liability insurer.

This case did not reach the issue of

an indispensible party in either the arbitration or litigation
contexts.

It also did not decide the issue of whether arbitration

is appropriate where it considers the interests of a non-party in
14
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the context

of a construction

contract.

This case is not

dispositive nor persuasive as to whether the valid arbitration
provisions in the case at bar are enforceable as between the
parties.

VI.

THERE IS NO ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. WHERE THE ONLY ISSUES OF FACT ARE
WITH RESPECT TO THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS TO BE ADJUDICATED,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT COMPELLING ARBITRATION SHOULD BE GRANTED IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF.
At page of 11 of Defendant's Reply Memorandum, Defendant

claims that Plaintiff has raised an issue of material fact as to
whether the arbitration agreements which are the subject of this
action

exist

arbitration.

so

as

to

avoid

summary

judgment

to

compel

Defendant misconstrues the facts and asserts that

there are no arbitration provisions to be enforced.

As discussed

previously herein, Plaintiff stated that its supervisor was on the
payroll of Defendant, so as to help Defendant meet its contractual
obligations with UDOT.

Such arrangement did not abrogate the

terms of the subcontracts.
chargeable

Payments made to the employee were

against the subcontract

amounts.

This fact is,

however, immaterial as to the determination of the issue of
whether the arbitration provisions are enforceable, which is a
matter of contract construction and a question of law.
Defendant, in making its argument has also misapplied the
wholly irrelevant case of Jackson v. Dabney, 648 P.2d. 613 (Utah
1982),

In Dabney the Utah Supreme Court held that summary

judgment was precluded where genuine issues of fact exist such
15

that reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct
was in breach of the standard of care required of an attorney in
dealing with his client*

Not only was the Court in Dabney not

called upon to decide the issue of whether

an

arbitration

agreement was enforceable, it did not even have to decide the
issue of summary judgment based on a contract claim.

The issues

of fact which are sufficient to preclude summary judgment as to
arbitration agreements are those which shed doubt as to whether
the right exists in the moving party.

Here the only questions of

fact raised by Defendant relate to the merits of Plaintiff's
claims and not its right to arbitrate.
by either party
regarding

There are no facts raised

about which reasonable minds could differ,

the enforceability

of the arbitration provisions.

Defendant, without saying so directly, seems to argue that if some
of Plaintiff's employees were on Defendant's payroll, then the
subcontracts

do

not

exist.

Such

an

argument

would

be

preposterous.
The arbitration agreements, as pointed out by Plaintiff here
and in its earlier memorandum, should be enforced as a matter of
law by way of summary judgment.

Plaintiff, under the facts on

record with this court is entitled to summary judgment compelling
arbitration as a matter of law, and also as a matter of well
established public policy.

16
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VII. THE POLICY FAVORING JUDICIAL ECONOMY IS NOT OFFENDED BY THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE.
Defendant argues that arbitration in this case will not be
more expeditious and inexpensive in the interest of judicial
economy and justice, because enforcing the arbitration agreements
will potentially

involve multiple proceedings

and possible

inconsistent determinations of the same issues regarding claims
which Okland hopes to pass through to UDOT.

Defendant also argues

that arbitration in this case would only frustrate the policies
which Plaintiff contends it is intended to further.

In making

this contention, however, Defendant has cited authority which is
not only unpersuasive, but that is not applicable to the issue
being decided in the present motion.

For example, Defendant

relies heavily on the case of Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Construction
Co., 558 P.2d 517 (Nev. 1976).

In that case, both the prime

contract and the subcontract contained arbitration agreements.
The court, in deciding whether to stay the proceedings between the
owner

and

the

consolidation
proceeding.

contractor
of the

pending

arbitration

arbitration
cases

in one

ordered

the

arbitration

The fact that both contracts contained arbitration

provisions distinguishes this case completely from the one at bar.
Furthermore, in Exber the court ordered arbitration.

Exber does

not stand for the proposition that where the owner is not subject
to the arbitration provision of the subcontract, the arbitration
should be disallowed in favor of litigation between all three
parties.

Furthermore, UDOT is not a party to either the present

litigation or the future arbitration.

It is, at this point, a

17
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wholly disinterested party who's rights cannot be effected by the
ruling

of

the

arbitration

panel*

This

action

is on

the

subcontracts alone.
Exber, however, does speak to the severability of nonarbitrable issues, which Defendant claims exist in the present
case in the form of pass through claims.

Notably, even the Exber

court held that "All doubts concerning arbitrability of subject
matter of the dispute are to be resolved in favor of arbitration;
once it is determined that an arbitrable issue exists, the parties
are not to be deprived

by the courts of

arbitration for which it bargained."

the benefits of

Id. at 523.

Defendant

contends that because certain claims may ultimately pass through
to UDOT, they are not the proper subject of arbitration.

The

issue of potential pass through claims is itself a factual matter
to be resolved by the panel of arbitrators.

Furthermore, if

Defendant did not want to have to arbitrate Plaintiff's claims
arising from the subcontracts, it should not have included the
arbitration agreements in its subcontracts.
Defendant also relies on the case of Belke v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce,

Fenner

& Smith, 693 F.2d

1023

enforcement of the arbitration agreements.

(1982), to preclude
In Belke Plaintiff

sought recovery for violations of the federal securities laws and
state common-law.
application

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and

for stay pending

district court.

arbitration were denied by the

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit held in favor of the Plaintiff and ordered
18

arbitration of its arbitrable claims.

The court found that

"because federal law favors arbitration, any party arguing waiver
of arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof."
federal securities claims are not arbitrable.

It also held that
Ultimately, the

court stated that when arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are
inextricably

intertwined,

the

district

court

should

deny

arbitration as to the arbitrable claims in order to protect the
jurisdiction

of

the

federal

court

and

avoid

any

possible

preclusive effect."
In the case at bar, there are no clearly non-arbitrable
claims, as Defendant would suggest.

Futhermore, there can be no

danger to the jurisdiction of the court where the State court is a
court of general jurisdiction and there is no federal question
raised by either party.

The arbitration award, if any, would be

subject to approval by the court and would not have any preclusive
effect not intended by the parties at the time of contracting •
Belke is therefore easily distinguishable from the case at bar and
has very little persuasive value.
Enforcement of the arbitration agreement in this case will
further the policies of judicial economy and justice and at the
same time give meaning to the intent of the parties expressed in
the subcontracts.

Arbitration will result in lower dispute

resolution costs to both parties, enforcement of the contract and
a narrowing of the issues, if any to be resolved as between
Defendant and UDOT.

Arbitration is proper in this case and should

be compelled.
19

Defendant also relies heavily on the case of Rosenthal v.
Berman, 82 A.2d 455 (New Jersey 1951) in support of its contention
that Defendant will be prejudiced if it is forced to arbitrate
Plaintiff's claims and then seek reimbursement
proceeding.

in a subsequent

But Rosenthal does not save Defendant under the

present circumstances.

In Rosenthal the court was faced with the

dilemma of five parties to the litigation, only two of which had a
contractual duty to arbitrate.

Here there are no parties to the

litigation which are not bound by the arbitration
Defendant

claims

that

severing

this

litigation

agreement.
into

the

arbitration and subsequent litigation of potential pass through
claims will increase the cost of justice, or cause undue hardship
to the parties.

UDOT is not a party either to the litigation or

the future arbitration.

Neither has it been established by the

appropriate finder of fact that pass through claims even exist
which Defendant will be forced to litigate with UDOT.

There is,

under the rule of Rosenthal or otherwise, no rational basis for
not compelling the arbitration of Plaintiff's claims.

CONCLUSION
Defendant has struggled to avoid arbitration in this case to
the point where it has made claims which are not supported by
either the facts of the case or by the relevant law.

Defendant

should honor its own subcontract obligations and not misconstruing
the facts and stretch legal authority in support of its misguided
allegations.

Plaintiff does not seek disposition of its claims in
20
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this action, but only the enforcement of its contractual right to
arbitrate its claims with Defendant.

Defendant has failed to

raise any question of material fact as to the enforceability of
the arbitration provisions of the subcontracts such that Plaintiff
is now entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
DATED this

day of February, 1989.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C.
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